The book promises a systematic study of the concept, and to show that there is a mathematical theory of dependence.
The paper in this volume [10] goes even further. It presents a logic of 'possible dependence', where the intended sense of 'dependence' is specified a bit further as follows:
By dependence we mean dependence as it occurs in the following contexts: Dependence of
• a move of a player in a game on previous moves
• an attribute of a database on other attributes
• an event in history on other events
• a variable of an expression on other variables
• a choice of an agent on choices by other agents.
In this short comment, we will not discuss the technical properties of Dependence Modal Logic. An excellent analysis of the proposed logic is made by Merlijn Sevenster in [7] . Sevenster proves that the expressive power of dependence modal logic does not exceed standard modal logic, but that dependence modal logic can express certain properties more succinctly (witnessed by the fact that adding the dependence atoms to the language increases the complexity from PSPACE to NEXP). Sevenster also proposes an attractive alternative notation for the dependence atoms: dep(x 1 , . . . , x n ; y) instead of =(x 1 , . . . , x n , y).
Rather than going into technicalities, we will try to discuss more generally what the dependence atoms, which one can see as declarations of dependence between variables ('attributes') or propositions ('facts'), do and do not express.
Actually, it was the request to comment on this work at the KNAWworkshop New perspectives on Games and Interaction that made me realize that the notion of dependence as defined in these atoms does not always coincide with common uses of the notion of dependence. Before the KNAW workshop, I wanted to prepare my oral comment to Professor Väänänen's presentation. I was convinced that what I was going to say, should depend on what he would talk about, how could it otherwise count as a comment? So, I prepared my comment only after carefully reading the material sent to me, and left openings for things that would come up during the actual talk.
But in the break before the talk, a more experienced speaker confided me that "if you are asked to comment on somebody's work, just talk about your own work." At first, I was confused by this advice, because it conflicted with the dependence I sensed in the concept of 'comment'. But then I realized that this was in fact totally consistent with the mathematical theory of dependence presented by Väänänen: I could just have prepared a fixed talk about my own work, even without reading the paper. According to Dependence Logic my comment would depend only on Jouko's talk: the comment would not depend on anything (would be constant), therefore it would depend on anything! Fact 1. For any propositions p, q, q 1 , . . . , q n : if =(p) is satisfied in a set of nodes, then so is =(q, p), and more generally: =(q 1 , . . . , q n , p).
The conclusion could be that the dependence implicit in the notion of 'to comment', is not just a functional dependence, but maybe a stronger sense of dependence. If you want to express that a different talk should amount to a different comment, one should add an injectivity condition on the function that establishes the dependence: With the usual dependence atoms (on variables) we have: =(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) is true for a set of valuations (a team) if y = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for some f . But it is not necessarily the case that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) implies f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Adding injectivity condition would express a stronger property: that the talk determines the comment (which may be too strong actually for this application).
This discussion shows that the "common phenomenon" that dependence is (quoting Väänänen), is not so easy to capture mathematically. In this comment we explore the kind of dependence expressed in the dependence atoms as proposed for Dependence (Modal) Logic a bit further.
What is dependence?
In order to clarify a bit what it could possibly mean, we simply retrieve the 'common' meaning(s) of the word dependence from the dictionary: dependence 1: the quality or state of being dependent; especially: the quality or state of being influenced or determined by or subject to another 2: reliance, trust 3: one that is relied on 4 a: drug addiction developed a dependence on painkillers b: habituation (From http://www.m-w.com/.)
If one proposes a mathematical theory of dependence, it is good to specify which sense of dependence one intends to formalize. It is clear from the contexts mentioned in the quote above from [10] , that for example ontological dependence, as in "a child is dependent on his parents" (sense 2 and 3) falls outside the scope of Dependence Logic. (For an overview of theories of ontological dependence, see [6] .) Obviously, also dependence in the sense of addiction (4) is not within the intended scope of Dependence Logic. The dependence atoms = (q 1 , . . . , q n , p) are declarations of dependence in the sense of 1: one fact is being determined by other facts, or for variables: the value of one variable is somehow determined by, or at least correlated with the values of other variables. But still one can wonder what we mean exactly by that.
A few interesting propositions
In Dependence Modal logic, the dependence atoms will be evaluated in a set of nodes. The modal aspect of the logic is that this set of nodes evolves along the accessibility relations in the Kripke model, by taking the modalities as operating on sets of nodes, starting from the set containing the actual node (or nodes). For the evaluation of the dependence atom, it is only the corresponding set of valuations for the propositional variables that matters. In fact, the dependence in Dependence Modal Logic is a propositional rather than a modal dependence (this in contrast to the independence in IF-modal logics as discussed in [8] ).
We discuss some (propositional) facts in Dependence Modal Logic.
Non-idempotency and bivalence
Let's look at the non-idempotency phenomenon pointed out in section 3 of [10] : the formula C := 2(= (p)∨ = (p)) is shown to be true in the given model N (ibid. Fig.4 ), while B := 2p is not. Note that this does not depend on the chosen model N , nor on the 2-modality. In fact, for any propositional variable p in any set of nodes (valuations) W : W |= (=(p)∨ =(p)), while W |= =(p) only holds if all valuations in W agree on p. It is easy to see that this fact 'expresses' the two-valuedness of the underlying propositional logic.
Compare this with (first order) Dependence Logic, where =(x) is true for sets of valuations that give x a constant value, (=(x)∨ =(x)) for sets that give x at most 2 values, (=(x)∨ =(x)∨ =(x)) at most 3, and so forth. To count the number of elements in a model, we need to put a universal quantifier in front (e.g. ∀x[=(x)∨ =(x)] is true only in models containing at most two elements). This is a difference with the two-valuedness of the propositional part of modal logic: this does not depend on a specific Kripke model, making the 2-modality in a sense irrelevant.
Does a consequence depend on its cause?
What could be the formal relation between causation and dependence: if one fact causes the other, does the one then also depend on the other? In the absence of a causation-connective, despite the fact that causation and (material) implication are notoriously different, we do a first test by investigating the following implicational formula. Does for each set of nodes W
The answer can be seen to be 'no': take W := {(p 0 ; ¬p 1 ), (¬p 0 ; ¬p 1 ), (¬p 0 ; p 1 )} (where we identify the three nodes with their valuations for p 0 and p 1 ). If we write out the implications, the question boils down to
We split W at the disjunction. Only the subset {(p 0 ; ¬p 1 )} satisfies the first disjunct, so {(¬p 0 ; p 1 ), (¬p 0 ; ¬p 1 )} should satisfy the second. But it doesn't, because p 1 gets a different truth value despite p 0 's truth value being the same.
However, note that both:
If two atomic propositions are equivalent, then the truth value of the one is a boolean function of the truth value of the other: it is the same. So, equivalent formulas are always mutually dependent!
Axioms for functional dependence
One thing a mathematical theory of dependence could be able to bring, is an axiomatization of the notion of dependence. Armstrong's axioms from database theory, are known to be sound and complete for functional dependence. They are actually not formulated in terms of a single attribute that may depend on a sequence of attributes, but in terms of sets of attributes. If we write =(X, Y ) for 'two database records that agree in the attributes in X, also agree in the attributes of Y ', they are: Of course, these are axiom schemes in the sense that they should be generalized to arbitrary numbers of variables (e.g. also =(x, y, t, z) ⇒=(x, t, y, z)). Rules 4 and 5 now appear because of the switch from sets to sequences. These axioms are really for functional dependence, and their soundness can be easily checked by writing them out in terms of the existence of functions. However, if we informally read the dependence atoms as 'depends (only) on', not all of them sound completely natural. For example, is it true that every attribute depends only on itself? And also, the augmentation rule 2 amounts to the paradox of Fact 1: a constant (an attribute for which =(x)) depends on nothing else, but at the same time it depends on anything else (= (y 1 , . . . , y n , x)). These considerations make us aware that Dependence Logic in fact remains a mathematical theory of the already quite mathematical functional sense of dependence.
Dependence versus independence
We make some remarks on the relationship between dependence and independence, which is the central concept in Independence Friendly Logic [2] . Instead of declaring dependence in an atomic proposition, the independence in IF-logic is declared at the quantifier: one lists the attributes on which some attribute is not supposed to depend, leaving the attributes on which it may depend to be determined by the context. This context is formed by both the other quantifiers within the formula, but also by the domain of the set of valuations (the 'team') for which the formula is evaluated. A detailed study of the effects of this latter part of the context can be found in [1] , where it is shown how equivalence for open formulas can only be soundly defined by fixing a context of variables. We note that the translation procedure from IF-logic to Dependence Logic in [9, . This formula is only true with respect to sets of valuations in which the value assigned to x is constant (then we can extend every valuation with the same constant assignment to y, thereby both satisfying =(y) and x = y). However, this is different for the original IF-formula ϕ. Consider the set of valuations V consisting of v 1 = (x → 0, z → 0) and v 2 = (x → 1, z → 1). This is a set in which x is assigned two different values, hence it does not satisfy ϕ * . It does however satisfy the IF-formula ϕ, because we can let the value we assign to y depend on (by making it equal to) the value of z.
To go from saying 'y must be independent of x' to 'y may depend on the variables other than x', one needs to be able to determine the set X of all variables that y could possibly depend on. For open formulas, this set consists not only of variables occurring in the formula, but also on variables in the domain of the valuations that may not occur in the formula itself (like z in the example).
In connection to the example, it is interesting to note that rule 3 from the previous section formalizes the issue that makes the validity of Hodges' [3] formula ∀x∃z ∃y /x [x = y] from IF-logic counterintuitive. On the one hand, y is declared independent only from x, not excluding that it may depend on z. But z may depend on x, and then for y to depend on z implies to depend on x by transitivity. This apparently violates the declaration of independence from x. Dependence Logic makes this nicely explicit:
Indeed, it follows from the transitivity rule that y also depends on x in this formula. Note that adding an extra conjunction to this translation, trying to enforce the independence requirement explicitly, does make the formula false, by contradiction:
But not always do we get such clean-cut contradiction from a negated dependence atom. As noted in section 5.2 of [7] , it is not really the case that negations of dependence atoms declare independence. In fact, a negated dependence atom is only true in the empty set of nodes or valuations, hence will not in itself express independence in non-empty sets. In order to express independence, one needs to jump to the meta-level of second order logic (to express that there is no function witnessing the dependence).
Dependence and independence are duals, but not really opposites in the contradictory sense. Therefore, it is not straightforward to make the switch from declaring dependence to declaring independence.
Conclusion
There are several reasons why the topic of Dependence Logic is at home within the theme New perspectives on Games and Interaction. There is a new perspective in the focus on dependence rather than independence, as in IF-logic.
Like IF-logic, the mathematical theory of dependence comes with a game theoretical semantics. Where IF-logic enlarged the field of logical games with games of imperfect information, Dependence Logic adds a uniformity condition on the winning strategies. This is a less standard generalization, in the sense that it is not part of standard game terminology. The correspondence with database theory, and correlations between attributes is more convincing in our taste. With respect to the interaction part: dependence can be seen as a form of interaction between facts. Note that the concept of (in)dependence does not arise in isolation (cf. [4] ).
The main conclusion after considering several Dependence modal formulas, is that the notion of dependence expressed in the dependence atoms, is strictly functional dependence. It allows to talk about functional dependence while keeping the function implicit (compare, for example = (y, x) with x = g(y) and =(q, p) with p ↔ (¬q)).
One can wonder what kind of dependence functional dependence actually captures. It is a bit counterintuitive for a notion of dependence to have things that are both dependent and independent on anything (viz. constants). It seems that functional dependence expresses some kind of 'correlation', which we sense to be a weaker notion than dependence.
But in the end, we think the historical (technical) evolution of logic provides the clearest view on the motivations for studying dependence and independence between variables and propositions. Dependence of one variable upon another is already a natural feature in logical languages, by the structure (nesting of quantifiers). The original spark to study dependence and independence was the generalizations of the specific syntactic pattern built in in first order logic ('Frege's fallacy' [2] ), and to see how they would behave and extend the expressive power of the language. A great motivational insight was Hintikka's idea to link the dependence of variables to availability of information in semantic games, and thereby independence to imperfect information. But as many examples have shown ( [5] , [3] ), interpretation of the IF-formulas naturally in terms of what one generally understands as 'independence', is not so straightforward.
Syntactic subtleties in the end turn out to be important spoilers for smooth and elegant results. This is shown in [1] by the amount of work we need there in order to restore the Prenex Form Theorem for IF-logic. But using this syntactic result, we are able to make a syntactic gain for first order logic: by translating a first order sentence into it's IF-prenex form, and then skolemizing it, we avoid unneccesary arguments in the Skolem functions. With these final remarks, I have managed to follow the advice on commenting: to speak about my own work.
